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What is the optimal breadth of political address for a party? Making a broad, general
appeal or coming up with a specific program designed to a well-defined target
audience? Searching the answer to this question, the paper presents a spatial
representation that is akin to the proximity models of electoral behavior (Downs
1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1973; Tullock 1972, Enelow and Hinich 1984, 1990;
Kollman, Miller and Page 1992; Westholm 1997; Quinn, Martin and Whitford 1999).
In proximity approaches, voters’ choices depend upon the distance between party
offer and the individual’s political preferences, both depicted as points in an -space
of  political issues that characterize political discourse. A novelty of the present
model is that a party’s political stance is not a single point in the -space, but rather, it
covers a non-zero range of attitudes along each axis. There is a halo around the party’s
address point called the party’s political niche or catchment area. This domain covers
the people whom the party targets with its offer. The breadth of a party program is
represented by the range of political tastes addressed by this program. The broader the
catchment area, the bigger the program generality.
The paper studies two ways of vote maximizing. First, parties can enlarge their
catchment area. Second, parties may try to obtain a bigger percentage of votes from
the population within the catchment area. This latter can be done by dedicated offers
suited to the demand of specific voter groups. The broadening of the catchment area
has a positive and a negative effect on the number of votes. The positive effect is that
the party’s potential voter base increases as new members of the populace are
addressed. The negative effect is that the offer has to be downscaled to the overlap in
tastes of all targeted groups. Addressing a heterogeneous set of people works against
the possibility of coming up with tailor-made bids for specific groups. For example, if
a party broadens its range of address along the left-right axis to reach new leftist and
3rightist voters, then it has to make its program compatible with the variety of tastes in
the enlarged catchment area. One option is to reduce program specificity to the
common minimum. Alternatively, the party can make symmetric concessions to each
group; e.g., promising more welfare measures for the leftists and reducing taxes for
the rightists. The program "grays out" in the lack of well distinguishable
characteristics in the first case, while it becomes incoherent in the second case. The
resulting political message though may remain acceptable to all targeted people in a
certain extent, but it won’t be especially attractive to any of them. Constituencies find
uncomfortable to support a party together with people whose political stances fall
quite far from their own. A wider political appeal increases the number of potential
voters, but it lowers the party’s overall attraction, and so, the percentage of people in
the catchment area who actually cast their vote to the party.
This trade-off can be seen as a special case of the organizational niche width
problem in organizational ecology (Hannan and Freeman 1989; Péli 1997;
Bruggeman and Ó Nualláin 2000). A wide (narrow) organizational niche may refer to
a product structure designed to a broad (narrow) range of customers. Though the
niche notion also has other connotations than political catchment area, it makes no
harm to use the two concepts synonymously in the context of the present paper.
Political parties, just like other organizations, can be typologized as specialists and
generalists according to the breadth of their political niches. Generalist parties have
broad niche, and their jack-of-all-trade strategy entails a neutral party program.
Specialist parties have narrow niche, which they utilize efficiently with their well-fit
exploitation technologies. (Figure 1).
The opposing tendencies between generalists' in-breadth and specialists' in-
depth voter-base utilization can imply an optimal niche size, and so, an optimal
political program specificity. How does this optimum look like, whenever it exists?
What is the effect of adding new topics to political discourse on this optimum? To
4answers to these questions, the paper first outlines a mathematical model. Second, it
derives formulae on optimal niche size, taking into account different voter tolerance
patterns with respect to political program generalization. Third, the paper discusses
the selective effects of the number of niche dimensions on specialist and generalist
parties.
--- Figure 1 comes about here ---
4.
4.3&&!&!!$
Political preferences are characterized with  independent characteristics; each of
them is displayed on an axis of the Euclidean issue-space. To avoid distortions due to
different measurement units, interval scales are assumed along the axes with
standardized variables. Each constituency has a most preferred position on each issue.
The location that represents a voter’s political preference is called his/her ideal point.
Each party program appeals to a certain range of political tastes within the
populace. A party’s opinion can be vaguer or sharper, i.e., general or specific, along
the addressed issues. A party’s political niche is defined as the domain that contains
the political tastes addressed by the party program. The size of the niche (the breadth
of address) is a deliberate decision of the party. A fragment of votes may even fall to
a party outside from its catchment area. However, the model ignores this possibility
being based upon the assumption that people cast their votes to a party if its political
address meets their respective tastes.1
                                                          
1
 This is clearly the case in the first election rounds in countries with a two-round election
system like France or Hungary. People vote to their favored parties/candidates in the first
round (a proximity choice), while they can vote against the "other side" in the second round (a
directional choice, cf. Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989; Macdonald, Listaugh and Rabinowitz
1991, 1998).
5In proximity models, the utility of a party for a voter depends on the distance between
their political stances. In the present model, a party’s utility for the people varies
according to its niche breadth. The more specific the program (narrower the range of
address), the more attractive the party, and the bigger amount of votes it obtains from
its niche. Figure 2 displays a possible relation between niche breadth, utility and the
amount of obtained votes.
Address is a dichotomous variable: the ideal point of a certain taste group is
either covered by the catchment area or it is not. Utility is a continuous variable with
a range between 0 and 1. The party’s utility refers to the percentage of people who
vote to the party from its niche. Zero utility (attraction) yields no votes; if utility is 1,
then everyone votes to the party from the niche.
--- Figure 2 comes about here ---
4.4!!!!#
In the simplest one-dimensional issue-spaces, the niche is a line segment. But what
kind of geometric shapes can catchment areas take if  > 1? Niches are depicted as -
dimensional cubes (hypercubes) or -dimensional spheres (hyperspheres) in the
ecological literature of spatial modeling. In political science, these two modeling
choices correspond to two distinct ways how voters judge party programs. First, the
electorate can evaluate a program in respect of each political issue separately. A
person falls into a party’s niche if the distance between her/his ideal point ideal point
and the center of the party program does not exceed  along any of the issues, where 
stands for the half niche breadth. The mismatches between party and voter positions
6are evaluated separately along the axes; that is, the "errors" do not add up in the
voters’ perception. The obtaining party niches are -dimensional cubes with 2 edges.2
A second interpretation on electoral perception assumes that voters consider
the overall match between party offer and their political stance. People make cross-
dimensional comparisons, measuring the pros and cons of programs, taking into
account all political issues. Now, mismatches between party offer and voter
preferences do add up in the voter’s evaluation. Under this interpretation, the party-
elector match can be characterized by their Euclidean issue-space distance, and this
yields spherical catchment areas. Note that having the same 2 niche breadth,
spherical niches are smaller in volume than cubic ones, reflecting a more critical
electoral attitude. We opt for this second interpretation. But several of the coming
findings will also apply to cubic niches.
Note moreover that the interval scales along the axes are composed of a finite
number of categories in reality. Accordingly, the issue-space has a grain; it is
composed of homogeneous taste cells instead of points. Therefore, the niche shapes
only approximate spheres, and this approximation improves with the number of taste
categories per axis.
Yet there is technical problem to be fixed. The relative importance of the
involved political issues can be represented by weights assigned to the axes. These
weights have a bearing on the catchment area shape; for example, people may tolerate
less deviation from their own views on salient issues. Therefore, parties might have
narrow address ranges when the importance of a political dimension is high.
Assigning weights to the axes involve  transformations on the niche shapes that
can make, for example, non-regular rectangles from squares, and flat ellipses from
                                                          
2
 Similarly, a biological specimen can survive within a given range of humidity, temperature
and illumination (Hutchinson, 1978), a voluntary organization attracts members from the
social -space within a threshold distance along each axis (McPherson 1983). This mode of
affiliation is called 	
 (Linton Freeman 1983).
7circles. With unity weights in place, the address ranges can be equal along all axes;
this implies geometrically far simpler catchment area shapes, and a simpler model.
Fortunately, we can go along with unity weights without affecting the generality of
the coming arguments. This is because affine transformations are linear, so one can







The next task is to specify the vote-maximizing radius, 0, of spherical party
catchment areas in the -dimensional issue-space. The number of people within the
niche is proportional to its -dimensional volume.3 Let this volume measure directly
the size of the population covered by the niche. The volume () of an -dimensional
sphere is:
(1)  = ·                  where only depends on 
The calculations reveal that  has no bearing on the results of the present part.
4
Formula (1) yields the volume of the -dimensional cube if  = 1. Therefore, all
coming results in this part apply also to cubic niches.
A party's utility to the constituency (attraction) is operationalized with the
probability that a voter in the niche votes to the party. Let () denote a party's utility
                                                          
3
 Competition (niche overlap) and inhomogeneities in the voter distribution within the niche
may cause errors. Taking these external effects into account is a task of further research.
4
 Please find all calculation details of the coming arguments in the Appendix.
8when its catchment area radius is . Multiplying () with the sphere volume gives
the party’s voter support () measured in terms of the number of obtained votes:
(2)   =  ·()
() is assumed to be continuous and monotonically decreasing with . Societies may
differ in their sensitivity to party program specificity, therefore the graph of () can
also be different. The existence and the magnitude of vote-maximizing niche breadth
depend on the concrete shape of (); therefore, a variety of potential utility function
forms will be studied in the coming sections.
--- Figure 3 comes about here ---
5.4"*$!" $"$*% $
Let's begin with the case when () is linear and party appeal is proportionally
decreasing with catchment area radius (Figure 3a). Maximum utility is 1, so the
applying linear functions are of the form (3). The voter support (4) has a maximum at
(5). 0 is the niche radius with which in place a party gets the biggest number of
votes. Beyond 0, the number of obtained votes gradually decreases to zero.
(3) ()= 1 -               where  > 0
(4)   =  (1 - )  =   (1 - )
)1(  )5( 0 +⋅= 


9Formula (5) reveals that the vote-maximizing niche radius is sensitive to the number
of aspects the voters take into account: 0 is monotonically increasing with  towards
an upper bound at 1/. The more issues are involved in the political discussion, the
bigger the ideal niche size. This finding suggests that each added topic create a
pressure that pushes parties towards generalism, other things being equal. Conversely,
the elimination of issues may induce specialization. The niche breadth optimum acts
as a filter: parties with a close-to-optimum niche size enjoy selection advantage.
How robust is the optimum shift with ? The growth of function (5) is
concave, so adding a new issue has a stronger effect on the optimum when space
dimension is low. In line with intuition, a newly introduced topic makes a bigger
impact if political discourse comprises only a few issues. Adding a second axis to a
one-dimensional space increases the optimal niche diameter with one-third, while a
third dimension brings only a one-eighth (12.5%) change. Extensions into the fourth
and fifth dimensions induce, respectively, 6.7% and 4.2% optimum increase (Table 1,
first column).
The conclusion that optimal catchment area size increases with relies upon
the chosen shape of the utility function. Do some similar regularities apply when ()
is non-linear? This latter hypothesis is phrased out as a proposition, and it will be
tested on other examples.
#$$ 3. The vote-maximizing party niche radius (program scope)
monotonically increases with the number of political issues.
As a second step, I study non-linear polynomial utility functions of the form (6).
Figure 3b displays the typical shape of the function graph.
(6) ()= 1 - N              where  > 0 and > 1
10
Having this kind of attraction pattern, people tolerate a certain extent of program
deviation from their ideal point without seriously penalizing the party. Accordingly,
the decline of () is modest at small radii. However, the fall becomes very steep at
bigger -s. The distinction between the zones of weak and strong responsiveness to
niche extension becomes even more accentuated as  gets bigger in the exponent
(Figure 3c). Multiplying the utility with the catchment area volume, the obtaining






1  →  2 33.3 22.5 17.0 13.6
2  →  3 12.5 9.5 7.7 6.5
3  →  4 6.7 5.4 4.6 3.9
4  →  5 4.2 3.5 3.0 2.7
0 converges to 1 in formula (7) as  increases. This is why the vote-
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The optimal niche breadth, 0, concavely increases with the number of political
dimensions towards an upper bound, in line with Proposition 1. Table 1 displays the
relative change of the vote-maximizing niche radius as new political dimensions are
added. Just like before, the general rule is that the optimal size is less affected by the
emergence of a new political issue when space dimension is high.
5.5!$&"$)$ $$'(
The functions studied up till now had the common property that utility reached zero at
a certain niche radius, constituting an upper bound for 0. But is there a finite optimal
niche size if party utility never becomes zero? Functions of the form (8) are feasible
candidates to model decreasing party appeal that approaches zero asymptotically.
The formula yields an exponential function if  = 1, and it gives a Gaussian if  = 2
(Figure 3d-e). For  > 1, the short- and medium run behavior of (8) is similar to that
of the polynomial functions in the previous section: a moderate utility decrease
becomes robust beyond a niche radius. The difference comes in the longer run,
function (8) smoothens out without hitting the bottom. The latter feature reflects the
fact that a decreasing number of voters still stick to the party, even if its program
scope is overspanned.
The maximal voter support obtains at (9). Again, the ideal radius becomes
larger when new political dimensions are added, confirming Proposition 1. But now,
0 grows without an upper bound. That is, the vote-maximizing niche size can





positive are  and  where)()8(  N−=
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optimum size is even proportionate to  if   = 1; then, each new political issue
induces exactly the same shift in 0.
This drive for boundless niche extension is not specific to exponential type
utility functions. Function (10) features a similar change pattern to (8): first a
moderate, then a pronounced and finally a smoothening out decrease without hitting
the bottom (Figure 3e).
One might also expect a similarity in the optimum change. But formula (11) discloses
a new kind of behavior. Now, the optimal niche size only exists if the number of
political issues is smaller than threshold . If  < , the optimum increases in a
slowing down manner with . But when the number of political issues reaches ,
formula (11) does not yield a positive real number on 0. Then, voter support
becomes monotonically increasing with catchment area radius (note that now  is
kept constant)! That is, unlimited niche extension becomes the way of getting more
votes for any  ≥ . Parties simply cannot overstretch their political program; the
bigger niche is the better.5
How strong is this pressure for boundless niche extension? Putting it
differently, how does the support function’s derivative (’) change with niche radius?
If the derivative decreases, the surplus in votes becomes less and less with ,
establishing a negative feedback that gradually stops down the niche extension. The
                                                          
5
 This hectic sort of optimum behavior is not specific to the given attraction function form, see














opposite outcome ( ’ is increasing with ) would mean a positive feedback: the
bigger the radius, the bigger the gain that comes from additional niche extension. In
this case, one expects a well visible and robust political program-broadening race in
the party population.
The calculations show that both of the two options might occur. Negative
feedback applies if  = ; then, the surplus in votes coming from niche extension
becomes less with . But the rules of the game modify as  exceeds . The derivative
of  becomes growing with  and the positive feedback applies: the surplus votes of
niche extension become even more numerous with . Then, only effects that have not
been discussed in this paper (like inertial forces against program change, the
finiteness of the voter base) can put a leash on niche size explosion. The robustness of
the process in case of positive feedback offers itself for empirical investigation. Can
we identify situations in political history when parties reacted with a wave of strong
program generalization to the appearance of a new political issue? Re-assessing
stories of robust political "openings" (program scope broadening) in party histories,
can we identify topics that had just gained importance by that time, offering a
possible ex post explanation to the events?
5.;!'&#'!#
In the cases addressed up till now, voter support had utmost one maximum and the
number of votes decreased monotonically towards zero beyond the vote-maximizing
niche size. However, some support functions may increase again once  has passed
the optimum value. Then, more than one local maxima may also occur. Consider a
utility function () that asymptotically approximates zero and with which in place
voter support has a single maximum. Add an arbitrary positive number to (), see
Figure 4.
14
(12)   *() = () + 
      where 
 is a positive constant
Function (12) approximates value 
 instead of zero with . With this utility function in
place, there is a fixed minimum probability 
 that a constituency in the party’s niche
votes for the party, without respect to its program breadth. Such situation may occur
when some people do not care about program specificity. These voters can be
susceptible to simplified, general populist appeals without respect to program
consistency. With utility function *() in place, voter support always becomes
increasing without an upper bound in the long run. This is because the surface below
line 
 adds up to infinity with . If parameter 
 is small enough, then the support
function () can have a local maximum; for bigger radii, the support function goes
downhill for a while, and finally it increases again in the rest of its domain (Figure
4a).
Voter support can also have multiple local optima. The function in Figure 4b
yields a twin-peaked support pattern. In this example, the first peak locates at 1 =
0.25, the second is at 2 = 1.25 in a one-dimensional issue-space. Just like in the
examples studied before, the maximum radii (1 and 2) get larger with . Moreover,
the two peaks get farther from each other with . Support functions with more than
two local maxima can also be specified in a similar vein.
--- Figure 4 comes about here ---
The findings of this section may explain certain size-composition outcomes in party
populations. It is a broadly registered fact in organizational science that the size
distribution in organizational populations can be discontinuous: organizations in the
middle size range are less frequent. One explanation is that the intensity of
competition is size-dependent (Hannan and Ranger-Moore 1990). Big organizations
15
(parties) fight most intensively with the bigger others. Therefore, medium big players
have inferior survival perspectives relative to the stronger big organizations, and also
to the small ones who (being insignificant) are exposed to weaker competitive
pressures from the big ones. When organizations reach medium size, they can also
suffer from the "liability of adolescence" that can come, for example, from a drift in
environmental conditions relative to those that prevailed at the organization’s
founding (Hannan 1998).
A further explanation of size discontinuity in organizational populations
comes from the resource partitioning model of organizational ecology. This theory
predicts a dual population structure in mature markets, industries, and political
systems, composed of a few big generalists at the center and a number of small
specialists at the margins that do not get in the way of the big players there (Carroll
1985; Carroll and Hannan 1995, 2000).
The results of this section add to this list. The trade-off between party niche
breadth and voter attraction can give rise to organization systems with smaller
specialists and bigger generalists due to the existence of more than one beneficial
niche sizes. Figure 4a exemplifies a case with a discontinuity with a single optimal
specialist position besides which generalists can also reap lot of votes. Here, the
recipe for party engineering is: specialize or be as generalist as possible. Figure 4b
displays an optimal specialist position 1, combined with one optimal generalist
position 2. Becoming a generalist from a specialist or vice verse is known to be a
risky enterprise because of the inertial forces that hinder the required structural
reorganizations (Hannan and Freeman 1989, Péli, Pólos and Hannan 2000). The
valleys in the support functions displayed in Figure 4 indicate an additional roadblock
to such transformations. A party that gradually changes its program scope may first
lose support before it arrives to the new optimum niche size. It is a recurring question
if gradualism or shock-therapy-style abrupt change is better at structural
16
reorganizations. This example suggests that gradualism may not pay-off when the
reorganization is about shifting niche size between two locally optimal positions. If
you have a good reason to change, then do it with a single jump in such cases.
;.<
=
The previous part revealed that the vote-maximizing catchment area size tends to
increase with . But does having a larger optimum radius also imply having more
votes? In general: not. Adding a new dimension to the issue-space can radically
decrease the amount of obtained votes at any niche radius.
;.3$$' 
When a new political issue is introduced, the -dimensional political tastes extend
into +1 dimensions and new taste combinations appear. The addition of a new topic
may activate some abstaining voters so increasing the participation rate at the ballot,
but the population size poses a strict upper bound on this process. Up till this point,
the model could go along with the comforting assumption that the issue space is
sufficiently broad in any directions. From now, the stretch of the taste distribution
along the axes becomes crucial. Having, for example, 5 categories along each axis
yields 5Q homogeneous taste cells in an -dimensional space. Each new added issue
divides the population, splitting up the cells, so the average number of people per cell
(voter density) declines. As a consequence, the space thins out with  (Péli and
Nooteboom 1999). Voter numbers in the catchment area will be lower in +1




The number of people in the niche can also increase or decrease simply due to the
modification of niche geometry that comes with changing . To demonstrate this
effect, we have to know how sphere volume changes with the number of dimensions.
For the sake of comparison, sphere radius is kept fixed now. This means that party
utility is also kept constant, so party support (2) can only change due sphere volume
effects. Function  in (1) played no role up till now.  gives the content of the
unity radius sphere in  dimensions (Figure 5a). This volume is 2 for one-dimensional
	





 	 	 
3D spheres.
Figure 5a displays an unforeseen effect: the unity sphere volume increases
with  up till 5 dimensions, and from then it asymptotically declines towards zero.
This non-monotonic pattern is not specific to unity spheres; it sustains in a broad
range of sphere radii. However, an increase in  pushes the volume maximum towards
higher dimensions. Conversely, the maximum moves to lower -s as  becomes
smaller (Figure 5a-b). If the radius is sufficiently small ( ≤ 2/π), the hump in the
graphs of Figure 5 completely disappears.
--- Figures 5a-b comes about here ---
Let’s increase space dimension gradually from  = 1 in Figures 5b, now keeping the
niche radius constant. The previous section disclosed the tendency that voter density
declines with . Now, we see that niche volume can first increase before it turns
decreasing with , having the radius fixed. In terms of voter support, these two
(density and volume related) effects may work against each other when  is small
(left from the volume maximum in Figure 5). If this is the case, then decreasing voter
density might be compensated with the increase in niche volume implied by the
18
dimension change. On the contrary, the thinning out and the volume loss effects
reinforce each other as  becomes sufficiently high: then, both voter density and niche
volume are decreasing with . This second consideration gives rise to the following
proposition:
#$$ 4. Parties lose support beyond a certain number of issue-space
dimensions, whenever a new political issue is introduced.
Figure 5b shows that the value of at which sphere volume is maximal is lower for
parties of small niche radii. This points out the fact that there can be a range in  along
which dimension change has an opposite effect on narrow-niche specialists than on
generalist parties. Consider for example a specialist party with a niche breadth fixed at
1 = 0.5 and a generalist party with a niche breadth fixed at 2 = 1 (Figure 5b). Let the
space dimension change from  = 4 to  = 5. Both parties would lose potential voters in
the same extent due to the thinning out process described in the previous section.
However, the generalist party’s niche content will increase, because its volume
maximum is at   = 5. The party gets potential voters from more taste-cells at five
dimensions than in four, partly being compensated for the thinning out effect. But, the
volume of the specialist party’s 1 = 0.5 broad niche is decreasing from its volume
maximum at  = 2. Consequently, the specialist party loses voters due to both volume-
and thinning out effects in the given example. The opposite happens when the issue-
space dimension decreases: then, specialists gain relative advantage over generalists, if
 is in the "right" range. These yield Proposition 3.
#$$5.There exist certain ranges of  along which:
adding a new issue improves the position of generalist parties relative to specialists;
removing an issue improves the position of specialists parties relative to generalists.
19
Proposition 2 stated that appending issues to the political discourse may not pay-off in
terms of the absolute number of votes. However, it can bring a relative advantage to
parties of a broad program scope, adds Proposition 3 to the picture. Specialism
becomes an inferior way of vote collection as the number of issues grows beyond a
limit. Conversely, generalism can become an inferior way of vote collection as the
number of issues falls below a limit. For example, clear-cut party stances become
important in times of wars or terrorist attacks, when the issue-space collapses and
political discourse boils down to a few or even to a single issue.
>.

The paper investigated the trade-off between the breadth of a party’s political niche
and the percentage of people who vote to the party from the niche. In case of all
studied utility functions, Proposition 1 (optimal niche breadth increases with ) was
supported, whenever the optimum existed. But, the change pattern of the vote-
maximizing radius was dependent on the shape of the utility function. Having linear
(3) or concave polynomial (6) functions, the always existing optimum moved towards
a ceiling. The explanation is that all concavely or linearly decreasing utility functions
become zero after a while, and this establishes an upper bound for voter support. A
different optimum change pattern was registered when utility did not hit the bottom
but approximated it beyond any limits. Having an exponential type utility change (8),
the optimum increased along the whole range of  without an upper bound. In case of
another asymptotic function, the optimal radius grew for a while with , but it
disappeared at a threshold. From then, unrestrained niche extension was the vote-
maximizing strategy, even if the issue-space dimension was fixed. The calculations
also exposed the possibility of a self-reinforcing niche extension loop when surplus
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vote becomes bigger at any increase of , pushing parties towards further program
generalization.
However, it is not proven in general that the optimal niche breadth increases
with  for all monotonically declining utility functions. But, it can be shown that the
optimum is always increasing (if exists), whenever the fall of utility with radius is
concave, see the details in the Appendix.
The paper specified examples when a dual party population structure was
expected with generalists and specialists. For example, an optimal specialist position
can coexist with a "super generalist" position, if party support is monotonically
increasing with  beyond the local optimum. This is the case, when a miniscule but
fixed proportion of the voting population is insensitive to the specificity or to the
consistency of the party program. We saw an example with two optimal niche radii;
then, a structure with two prevalent (specialist and generalist) niche sizes is expected.
The observation that the optimal niche breadth tends to increase with  does not
imply that parties earn more votes in higher dimensions. The issue space thins out
with  because people are distributed along more and more cells. We also found some
unexpected consequences of -sphere geometry. Sphere volume, and so the amount of
voters within the niche, can change non-monotonically with ; the sphere content first
increases, and then it turns decreasing with space dimension, provided that radius is
fixed at a sufficiently high value. But if the niche radius is small, the sphere volume
monotonically decreases along the whole range of  (Figure 5). Therefore, the
thinning out effect and the volume decrease effect will point into the same direction
when  becomes high enough, and parties lose support at each upward shift in
dimension (Proposition 2).
The turning point from which niche volume becomes decreasing with moves
upwards with niche radius. This implied that generalist and specialist parties might be
affected differently by the change of space dimension (Proposition 3). Along certain
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ranges of , an increase gives relative advantage to generalists over specialists, while
a decrease favors specialists. Note that while Proposition 1 was justified only for
certain utility function types, Propositions 2-3 are derived consequences, theorems, of
the model.
Some issues for further research are the following. The findings of the paper
rely on a number of assumptions. One premise is that the grain of the issue-space is
fine, so the taste categories are distributed densely along the axes. Having only a few
categories per axis would imply a coarse-grained issue space with big taste cells,
making the approach with spherical niches untenable. A coarse grained issue-space
makes certainly less trouble in case of rectangular niches. (As it was discussed before,
all niche optimum calculations were insensitive to the choice between spherical and
cubic niches).
A second supposition is that voter distribution does not change drastically in the
neighborhood of the catchment area, so the amount of voters addressed by the party
program can be estimated by the niche volume. This usually can be taken for granted
for specialists, but not necessarily for bigger generalists. For the latter, the finite
extension of the issue-space may also pose expansion limits. A third aspect that
requires further elaboration comes from the fact that party catchment areas typically
overlap. The mechanism that describes vote distributions between parties in their
niche overlap cannot be based upon solely on program breadth. When voters are
addressed by more than one party, they also compare their distances from the centers
of the competing party programs, as it is described in the mainstream proximity
models. Then, the proximity- and the niche breadth effects may determine party
utility jointly. In this sense, the present model can be seen as a complement to the
proximity approach, and building the two model machineries into one provides an
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 (1) = ·() = ()     where  is a constant when  is fixed
(2)-= ( -1() + -()) = -1 ( () + -() )
 has an extreme point different from zero (what is a maximum) if and only if:
(3) () + ·-() = 0
(4) is non-negative because  and () are non-negative, and -() is negative as
utility is decreasing with   If  increases in (4), then an increasing  implies a
decreasing () in the denominator. So, the answer to the question if the optimal
radius increases with  depends only on -(). Then, the optimum is certainly
increasing (whenever it exists), if -() is a negative constant or decreasing with 
Then,() is (weakly) concavely decreasing. Note that the optimum always exists in
this case, because the right side of (4) is continuous function that takes the value zero
at  = 0, and it is increasing without an upper bound; so, it equals  at a certain 
value. However, if -() is strongly increasing with , then it is not proven if it can or
cannot turn the whole expression decreasing with .
"*$!" $"$*% $
(5) ()= 1 - N              where  and  are positive, and  = 1 gives the linear case
(6) -()= - N-1
)(
)(’







Instantiating functions (5) and (6) to optimum condition (3), we get for the optimal
radius 0:
(7)  (1 - 0N) - 0·0N-1= .0N( + )  /0
(8)   = 0N( + )
#$!"*# $"$*% $
Instantiating functions (10) and (11) to optimum condition (3), we get for optimal
radius 0:
As the exponential factor in (13) is always positive, the expression in parenthesis has
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Instantiating functions (15) and (16) to optimum condition (3), we get for optimal
radius 0:
Equation (17) was multiplied by an item that contained variable 0, and this may
cause the appearence of false roots. Instantiating (21) into (17) reveals that (21) is a
root indeed.
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If  = , then:
The right side of (24) converges to zero asymptotically with , and so - also
approaches zero asymptotically. That is, the growth of  slows down with .
If =  + 1, then:
If  → ∞, the right side of (25) is monotonically increasing towards limit value Q/.
This means that - is also monotonically increasing with . So, the gain in votes gets
bigger with the niche radius if =  + 1.
If>  + 1, then the right side of (25) is multiplied by X,  where  ≥ 1. In
























































































































Instantiating functions (26) and (27) to optimum condition (3), we get for optimal
radius 0:
Equation (28) was multiplied by an item that contained variable 0, and this may
cause the appearence of false roots. Instantiating (32) into (28) reveals that (32) is a
root indeed.
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If  = , then:
The right side of (35) converges to zero asymptotically with , and so - also
approaches zero asymptotically. That is, the growth of  slows down with .
If =  + 1, then:
If  → ∞, the right side of (36) is monotonically increasing towards the limit value
Q/Q-1. This means that - is also monotonically increasing with . So, the gain in
votes gets bigger with the niche radius if =  + 1.
If>  + 1, then the right side of (36) is multiplied by X,  where  ≥ 1. In




























































































































The voters’ space is two dimensional in this example. Cilinder volumes stand for the amount of










The horizontal axis stands for a one-dimensional preference space. The rectangles represent the amount of
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                        1 –                if  < 0.625
()  =
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is at  = 5
 = 0.5, volume
max. is at  = 2
1
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